democracy, can enact policies from one day to the next. He can rapidly change course without paying a political price. He can invade Ukraine without provocation and then stop the invasion, with no one questioning the logic. He can invade Syria, claim to stop, but then continue, with no one objecting. He can arrest or harass dissidents, hire and fire the CEOs of large companies, publish disinformation as he wishes.
Yet at the same time, Russia is an extraordinarily weak power-and it is weak, firstly, because of the manner in which President Putin and the autocratic, kleptocratic elite came to acquire so much centralized control. The long version of that story has now been told several times, in books by Karen Dawisha, Fiona Hill, Masha Gessen and others. The short version is that, at the end of the 1980s, Putin and his KGB colleagues saw that the Soviet Union was collapsing. In league with Russian organized crime, they began plotting to take over its assets. With the assistance of the unscrupulous international offshore banking industry, they stole money that belonged to the Russian state, took it abroad for safety, reinvested it in Russia, and then piece by piece, in conjunction with others, slowly took over that state themselves. Putin is the nominal head of this system, but in fact it is a kind of spider-web, a system of co-dependency, out of which he has emerged as the central hub.
As a result, Russia today is a mafia state par excellence: Both the economy and the political system are controlled by the same people, and not just metaphorically. It is not unusual, in Russia, for the chairman or senior manager of one of the big oil and gas companies to hold a second job in the presidential administration. Nor is it unusual for Kremlin leaders to make economic and foreign policy decisions which are designed to benefit the companies which they themselves own. Indeed, this would be difficult to avoid: politicians are the most important shareholders in the most important companies, and vice versa. That means, however, that the institutions of that state exist not to serve the Russian people, but to steal from them, to take advantage of them, and sometimes to launder money and take it abroad.
As an economic system, this works very well for the people who are the owners. But it works badly for the country. Both the Russian budget and Russian growth are heavily dependent on natural resources prices. At the beginning of 2016, the Russian finance minister admitted that the Russian budget had been based on the assumption that oil would be priced above $80 a barrel. 1 As of this writing, the price is below that. The impact of a low oil price has recently been exacerbated both by Western sanctions on selected Rus-sian companies and by Russia's response to Western sanctions, which was to boycott Western food products. Because Russia is heavily dependent on imported food, the dramatic rise in food prices has, of course, hit the poorest Russians more than anyone else.
But even if oil were high and sanctions were lifted, the Russian economy would still be weakened by its structure. Although some economists like to talk about Russia as a "wild west" form of capitalism, in fact it has only the most superficial trappings of modern capitalism. It does not have rule of law. It does not have a reliable court system. Bureaucracy is profoundly corrupt. As a result, Russia is a tricky place to be an entrepreneur: It is hardly worth investing in a country where, if you make a profit, you can never be absolutely certain whether you will be able to keep it-unless you have connections, of course.
This economic weakness is made dramatically worse by political weakness. Because Putin came to power through theft and corruption he is, in a very deep sense, an illegitimate ruler. He has never won a truly democratic election. He has never allowed a genuine opponent to run against him. He wins elections through outright fraud-stolen votes-as well as subtler manipulation of the media and of his opponents. He is kept in power not because of a popular mandate but because a cabal of businessman selected him as their leader.
Putin knows that he is illegitimate-and everyone around him knows it too. Russian media does, it is true, constantly publish opinion polls that show Putin's popularity, but these have to be interpreted with care. In a country where television is controlled by the Kremlin, the police have impunity, and surveillance is ubiquitous, it is not possible to measure public opinion with any accuracy. Imagine you are a taxi driver in Krasnoyarsk, and you receive a phone call from a polling organization in Moscow asking "do you like the president?" Not knowing who is on the other line or why they are really calling, you will almost certainly answer "yes," whether or not you believe it.
Putin himself fears that these polls are unreliable and that his support is unstable. His insecurity-and his consequent fear of a public uprising or revolution-first became publicly manifest in 2011, soon after his re-election to a constitutionally dubious third term. At that time, large crowds appeared not only in Moscow and St. Petersburg but several dozen other cities as well. The demonstrators alleged electoral fraud, for which there was certainly evidence. More importantly, they reflected the success of a growing anti-corruption campaign led by the activist Alexi Navalny, among others, and one which has recently gained even more traction. In March 2017, thousands of Russians all over the country-not just in Moscow but in dozens of other towns and cities-joined protests organized online. The profoundly kleptocratic nature of Putin's Russia has now been widely exposed on the internet, through publications and online campaigns. Putin has openly blamed the American administration for "organizing" these demonstrations, and declared that Secretary of State Clinton had "given the signal" for the 2011 demonstrations. On the night of his re-election that year, Putin denounced those who had dared to campaign against him. He had won the election, he declared with great passion, tears welling up in his eyes:
We showed that no one can impose their will on us. Not anyone, and not in any form. We showed that our people know how to distinguish between the desire for change and renewal, and political provocations that pursue the sole objective of undermining Russia's statehood and usurping power. 2 In fact, the Russian street demonstrations have so far been easily crushed. The mostly middle-class demonstrators hardly formed a majority. But the fact that the protests have occurred at all in what had seemed a well-controlled-even contented-semi-police state does help explain the extreme reaction that President Putin had to the events in Ukraine in February, 2014, when another street crowd persuaded the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to flee the country. Although the demonstrations had been sparked by Yanukovych's refusal to sign a trade agreement with the European Union, in truth they were motivated by the same kind of anti-corruption anger and activism that had motivated the Russian demonstrators two years earlier.
All of this puts Putin in an odd position. As I said, he controls many levers of power. He can say and do what he pleases. But at the same time, evidence of his own weakness, and his country's weakness, is all around him. Putin's Grand Strategy flows from that odd combination. Repression at home; Disinformation and destabilization campaigns in Europe and the US; Military intervention in Ukraine and Syria; all of these result from the simultaneous strength and insecurity of the Russian leader.
RepRession at home
Vladimir Putin came of age in Yuri Andropov's KGB, an organization he first tried to join at the age of fifteen. He also shared some life experiences with Andropov, a man who later became his hero. As ambassador to Budapest in 1956, Andropov had been shocked when young Hungarians first called for democracy, then protested against the communist establishment-and then took up arms against the regime. Putin had a similar experience in Dresden, in 1989, where he witnessed mass street protests and the ransacking of the headquarters of the Stasi, the East German secret police. German colleagues of his, he recalled years later, had suddenly lost their jobs and their privileges from one day to the next-and it was shocking.
Both men drew the same conclusion from these traumatic experiences: Talk of democracy-even if it seems insignificant-leads to protest. Protest leads to attacks on the guardians of the system. Better to stop all talk of democracy before it gets any farther. This is not to say that Putin is Andropov, or that Putin wants to bring back the Soviet Union. But it does mean that Putin-and, more importantly, most of the people around him-remains steeped in the organizational culture of Andropov's KGB. At the most fundamental level, he and the people around him believe deeply that the rulers of the state must exert careful control over the life of the nation. Events cannot be allowed just to happen, they must be controlled and manipulated. By the same token, markets cannot be genuinely open, elections cannot be unpredictable, and the modern equivalent of the Soviet dissidents-the small groups of activists who oppose centralized Kremlin rule-must be carefully controlled through legal pressure, public propaganda, and, if necessary, carefully targeted violence.
Just like their Soviet predecessors, Putin and the men around him also assume that anyone not supportive of their regime is by definition suspicious, and probably a foreign spy. At a rally as long ago as 2007, Putin declared that "Unfortunately there are still those people in our country who act like jackals at foreign embassies . . . who count on the support of foreign funds and governments but not the support of their own people." 3 This was a direct warning to Russia's few remaining human rights and trade union activists, as they well understood at the time. It was also a comforting signal to Putin's followers, who continue to believe, like Soviet secret policemen before them, that all important decisions are best made in Moscow, by a small, unelected group of people who know how to resist these foreign conspiracies.
Putin does not merely dislike his would-be democratic opponents; he believes that they are illegitimate and probably sinister agents of foreign powers. He does not just object to the liberal political system they claim to support; he believes they are plotting to "destroy Russian statehood," "usurp power," and hand the country over to rapacious outsiders. It is a mistake to believe that this kind of talk is mere propaganda. In the past few years, as historians have had more access to Russian archives, it has become ever more clear that Soviet leaders meant what they said, even when they were using what sounded to us like absurdly ideological language. Without evidence to the contrary, we should assume Putin means what he says too.
Certainly Putin's peculiar position leads him, increasingly, to suppress opposition inside his own country. During his first term as president, verbal and written opposition were tolerated, so long as they did not reach too many people or make too much noise. The electoral process was not so much manipulated as "managed." There were no accidental victors in Russian elections-because there are no accidental candidates. Even now, the semblance of choice is carefully preserved, not just through the advance choice of the winner, but through the advance choice of his opponents. The Kremlin insures there are always several candidates from several parties-some of which have been especially created to look like opponents of the status quo. The revival of the fake opposition party, a phenomenon familiar from communist eastern Europe, is one of Putinism's great contributions to modern political life.
The best example is one of the most famous: Vladimir Zhirinovsky's so-called Liberal Democrats, a group which routinely won parliamentary seats by sounding more nationalist and more extreme than the mainstream Kremlin parties somehow always voted with the Kremlin. More recently, the Kremlin has tolerated weak opponents such as the oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, who was allowed to stand against Putin in recent elections, though he had no chance of success.
By contrast, the Kremlin's genuine opponents have been marginalized, beaten up at demonstrations, jailed, harassed, and insulted. The Other Russia, the political grouping created by Garry Kasparov, the former chess champion, was once described on the state-owned website Pravda.ru as a "motley army of deviants, criminals, wannabe politicians, fraudsters and gangsters on the fringes of Russian society." 4 After 2011, judges handed down jail terms to political demonstrators for plotting "mass unrest." Police have also raided the homes of opposition leaders, and lawmakers have increased fines for "illegal protests," re-criminalized libel and expanded legal definitions of "treason" in order to control their opponents.
Occasionally, somebody who pushed up against the limits of the system is mysteriously murdered. Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist, was murdered several years ago for investigating too closely the Russian state's role in the Chechen War. More recently, Boris Nemtsov, a former deputy minister who was a very open opponent of Putin, was also murdered very brutally, in the middle of Moscow, on a bridge right across from the Kremlin.
At the same time, the state puts constant pressure on any organizations that are in any way independent or spontaneous, essentially any organizations that are not controlled by the state. This includes not only the media, but charities, ombudsmen, and non-governmental organizations of the most apolitical kind. USAID has been banned from Russia, as has the British Council an organization that promotes British culture. Any group which accepts any foreign funding has to register as a "foreign agent," a phrase which in Russian, as in English, implies espionage. That ruling alone has led charities and foundations of all kinds to withdraw from Russia in recent years, or to halt funding of Russian projects out of concern for the safety of staff and of grant recipients on the ground. The host of people and organizations with Western links and democratic aspirations which grew in the 1990s, and flourished even in the early 2000s, has now been reduced to a tiny and discouraged minority.
attacking the "DemocRacy naRRative" abRoaD Thanks to his efforts over many years, domestic opposition in Russia is very weak. But the broader "democracy narrative"-the pull of Western Europe and the United States, the existence of an alternate economic and political model right on Russia's doorstep, one which exposes "Putinism" as corrupt and illegitimate-remains very powerful. For that reason, Russia has, for the past decade, begun to devote extraordinary resources to a political and information war designed to undermine and eventually destroy Western democracies as well as Western institutions, especially the European Union. Again, Putin knows that economically Russia is weaker than Europe, and the appeal of the "Russian model" is non-existent. But he had a strong motivation, therefore, to undermine the EU using cheaper, subtler tactics.
In part, the motivation for Russia's dislike of the EU is economic. In its bilateral relationships, Russia is at least as strong as Germany, France, or Britain, and is much stronger than almost every other EU country. But when Russia faces the EU as a whole, it is much weaker. A few years after Poland first joined the European Union, Russia decided to test the system and announced a boycott of Polish meat under completely spurious "health" allegations. The Poles turned to the European Union and sought an all-European response. The European Union acquiesced. This was a very important turning point: Russia learned that it could not single out, pick off, or deal with European countries one by one and bully the weaker ones, as it had in the past. Indeed, the EU, when unified, is the only power inside Europe truly capable of pushing back against Russian corruption, Russian blackmail and of course the Russian gas monopoly in Europe. The EU, in other words, is capable of hitting the wallets of Russia's leaders directly.
In part, Putin's motivation is also ideological. Until very recently, the European Union was seen as a great economic success, an engine of growth and stability. More to the point, it had incorporated the former "eastern bloc" nations of Central Europe over the past quarter century, removing them from Russian influence and helping them to become more democratic and prosperous. The EU was also attractive for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, offering an alternative model of development that seemed fairer and more appealing than the model of corrupt oligarchy offered by Russia. For Putin-who remembers 1989 as a great personal and political catastrophe-the idea that the EU might become attractive to Russia is terrifying. And so he has sought to undermine it.
Both the techniques and the method differ greatly from traditional Soviet methods of propaganda. The Kremlin is not trying to "sell" itself or its model, as it did during the Cold War. Instead, it offers support to anti-European or anti-democratic ideas in whatever form they exist, customising its tactics to suit each country, using classic disinformation tactics as well as political funding and ordinary corruption to pursue its goals. Instead of agitating, it seeks to keep audiences distracted and cynical. Instead of offering a positive vision, Russia promulgates nihilism. It does so both overtly-though foreign-language television such a Russia Today or RT, which now broadcasts in English and Spanish-and the self-styled news agency Sputnik International-and covertly, using notionally independent journalists, experts and commentators, many of whom lack legitimacy or status elsewhere, as well as Internet trolls and other paid propagandists on social media.
This system of journalists and pseudo-journalists, fake experts and trolls, operates in every European country and every language. The underlying message is simple: the United States is engaged in a selfish, ruthless bid for world domination. By implication, anything Russia or any other country can do to resist this is commendable and justified. This narrative portrays the foundations of modern Euro-Atlantic security-including NATO enlargement to former communist countries and Western support for Ukraine-as hypocritical and unjust. Central European countries are depicted as hysterically Russophobic U.S. puppets run by unscrupulous elites who do not have their peoples' interests at heart. This message is customized for particular markets, varies from country to country, and includes both local and foreign policy themes. Kremlin outlets accuse Finnish authorities of child abduction in disputes arising over child welfare and custody battles following the breakup of FinnishRussian marriages. In Germany, one propaganda campaign featured an (invented) sexual assault by migrants on "Lisa," a Russian girl living in Germany. In Britain, the Sputnik International "news agency" highlighted the EU's shortcomings during the recent EU referendum campaign. In Poland, Russia uses far-right and nationalist websites to assert that the West undermines national values, that Germany and Ukraine are the enemies and that the U.S. is not to be trusted. The Baltic states and Ukraine are portrayed to their own people as failures-blighted by corruption, disorder, emigration and poverty-and run by a sinister elite of Western puppets with fascist sympathies. At the same time, Russia threatens Finland with World War III and Sweden with "retaliatory actions" if either country joins NATO, and warns Denmark that it will become a nuclear target if it joins NATO's missile defense program. Kremlin propaganda also rebuts and deflects any criticism of Russia's own behavior. All negative commentary about Russia is portrayed as either invented or unfair: the result of double standards, prejudice and self-interest.
At the same time, Russia funds people and political parties which pump out the same or similar messages, and especially those which attack the European Union. Russia openly funded the election campaign of Marine Le Pen's anti-EU, anti-NATO National Front, through loans worth millions of Euros, and Russian hackers sought to compromise her opponent, Emmanuel Macron. A Russian company, Lukoil, was openly involved in the political campaign of the pro-Russian Czech president, Milos Zeman. Other kinds of support-and possibly covert funding-also are made available to the Austrian Freedom Party, Germany's Pegida movement and Hungary's Jobbik as well as anti-European parties in Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia and others. Russian media pushed hard for the Brexit campaign in Britain, as well as Scottish independence, presumably on the grounds that a broken United Kingdom with a reduced role in European politics would be less powerful.
At times, it can seem like a very strange game. In some places, Russia courts select members of the political and financial establishment, while at the same time supporting their ideological enemies. In Britain, Russia has friends in the financial district. At the same time, the British version of Russia Today has regularly featured Julian Assange of WikiLeaks; the British anti-capitalist activist, George Galloway; and even Jeremy Corbyn, the far-left leader of the Labour party. In Poland, the Kremlin has links to far-right websites which foster anti-Ukrainian sentiment as well as anti-Western and anti-American messages. The Russian goal in Poland, equally paradoxically, is not to create a pro-Russian climate but simply to create instability and chaos: Russia will support any groups, fringe or mainstream, which seem likely to undermine Poland's influence and impact in Europe-even if those same groups are also anti-Russian.
Most startling of all was Putin's decision, in 2016, to deploy these same tactics in the United States. As of this writing, it is clear that Russia sought ties to Donald Trump and his family for the many years before seeking to aid him in the U.S. campaign. Trump had made multiple forays into the post-Soviet world, investing with oligarchs in Russia and Azerbaijan, staging a Miss Universe contest in Moscow, angling to attract Russian money to his projects in North America. 5 Thanks to some of those contacts, he was offered direct help in the election. The cyber-theft of material from the Democratic National Committee, and its publication on the eve of the Democratic National Convention, mirrored similar disinformation games played by Russia and Russian surrogates in Ukraine, Poland and elsewhere. His campaign used many tacticsincluding fake websites and Internet trolls -which had long ago been piloted by Russia in Europe.
By intervening so blatantly in U.S. politics, Putin of course took a larger risk than usual. But the pattern of behaviour was nothing new. Every tactic the Kremlin has used in the election-stealing and publishing computer files, pumping up extremist language, seeking to surround a candidate with pro-Russian advisers who can privately offer investment funds-has been used before in Europe. So far Putin has paid only a minor price for playing such games-the Obama administration confiscated some Russian property in the U.S. in response to the U.S. election hacking, but that was all.
FoReign policy aFteR the UkRainian RevolUtion
Like his policy of domestic repression and his information campaign against Europe, Putin's foreign and military policies in Ukraine and Syria are also motivated by his desire to stay in power, and to compensate for Russia's weak economy. Ukraine was a problem for Putin, and remains a problem for Putin, precisely because Ukraine is historically close to Russia. Most Ukrainians speak Russian; many Ukrainians are married to Russians. For that reason, the 2014 Maidan revolution was, as noted, particularly terrifying for the Kremlin: It was a democratic street revolution of the kind that Putin fears deeply in Russia-and one which was conducted by people who are culturally very similar to Russians. Worse, the crowds in Ukraine's Maidan were chanting anti-corruption slogans and waving the European flag: They were inspired, in other words, by the same ideals and the same European institutions that Putin has been trying subtly to undermine. After Ukraine's corrupt president fled the country, Ukrainian television began showing the pictures of his palace, complete with gold taps, fountains, and statutes in the yard-exactly the kind of palace oligarchs inhabit in Russia. Because of its potential ideological power in Russia, Putin has done his best, from the beginning, to turn the Ukrainian anti-corruption revolution into a disaster. His invasion of Crimea had both strategic and political significance. On the one hand, he wanted to claw a "victory" for Russia out of the very real ideological defeat that the Maidan revolution represented. On the other hand, he wanted to demonstrate that he could change a European border using military force-something which has not happened since the Second World War. By doing so, he deliberately violated both written and unwritten rules and treaties in Europe, demonstrating his scorn for the status quo.
In the wake of that "success," Putin launched a much broader attack: a series of attempted coups d'état in Odessa, Kharkiv and several other cities, all majority Russian-speaking. This time, the strategy failed, not least because Putin profoundly misunderstood Ukraine: Ukrainian Russian-speakers are not necessarily "pro-Russian" in the sense that Putin believed they would be. Only in Donetsk, where Putin was able to move in troops and heavy equipment from across the border, did a local coup succeed. But even there he did not create an attractive "alternative" Ukraine. Instead, the Donbass remains a zone of chaos and lawlessness. It was in that zone where the Malaysian Air plane was shot down and where thousands of people have now died in fighting which has never really stopped.
The multiple Ukraine invasions were, of course, also designed to appeal to Putin's domestic audience. They were accompanied by an emotive historical narrative. The new Ukrainian government was described as "Nazi" and "fascist," and the Russian-backed separatists fighting there were described as defenders of the motherland. Bloody, violent scenes were shown on the nightly news, with the intention of creating anger and anxiety. The Maidan revolution was portrayed as a Western plot, carefully planned by American foundations. Stories about Ukraine are invariably focused on violence and corruption, as Russian television continually beats home the message that the Ukrainian state is a failure and a disaster. Still, the Ukrainian "story" did, over time, begin to garner less attention. The state did not fail quite fast enough, and the Russianbacked separatists did not make attractive heroes. And so Putin shifted his attention to the Middle East.
Putin's entry into Syria, like almost everything else that he does, was also part of his own bid to maintain his legitimacy and to stay in power. He does not have the military muscle to project genuine influence into the Middle East. Nor did he get much of material or strategic importance out of his alliance with the embattled Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad. But he did attain the appearance of influence, and that is what really mattered. He distracted his public from the failing war in Ukraine, he put Russia "on centre stage," and he inspired several European politicians, including Sigmar Gabriel, the deputy German chancellor, and Boris Johnson, the U.K. foreign minister, to call for "greater cooperation" with help lift the sanctions that are dragging down the Russian economy and hitting the wallets of some of his closest friends.
He also seeks to demonstrate, in Syria, the solidarity he feels with other dictators threatened by revolution. The arrival of Russian troops, in Syria some in transit directly from the Ukrainian border, is designed to reinforce this message: Putin is ready to end the "chaos" which, he implies, could easily engulf other countries too. Coincidentally or not, his intervention has also helped increase the number of refugees leaving Syria and seeking to enter Europe, thus helping to destabilize Europe further.
Putin's invasion of Ukraine has been bad for his countrymen and bad for his country-for its economy, its image, its influence-and a tragedy for Ukraine. Expect the same kind of outcome from his incursion into Syria too.
What comes next? For the past year, Putin has hinted, sometimes quite overtly, that he seeks a further European confrontation. In the summer of 2016 he began a major military build-up on the borders of Ukraine. Prior to that, he began playing games with NATO forces in the Baltic region, sending planes into Swedish airspace, kidnapping an Estonian officer from over the border, threatening Lithuanian fishing boats, and in September 2016, coming within ten feet of a U.S. warplane on routine manoeuvres over the Black Sea. The reasons for these games are obscure: he may truly be planning an invasion of Ukraine, he may be seeking to provoke a conflict, or he may be hoping to create an impression of uncertainty, thereby lowering the deterrence value of NATO and making its members feel insecure.
Or he may simply be putting pieces in place in case there is another political crisis, another protest, an even sharper economic decline. Then he can step in once again, create a foreign policy crisis-and make himself central to the solution. At the beginning of this essay, I called Putin's tactics a "Grand Strategy," but of course it is really something rather different than that. It is the struggle of an autocratic and kleptocratic elite to stay in power through the resolution of crises which it has itself created. And we should be prepared for more to come.
NOTES

